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An Overview of Minnesota's Role in the 
Federal Nuclear Waste Disposal Process 
GREGG lARSON 
Gregg Larson is the director of the Minnesota High -Level Radioactive Waste Program. 
Introduction 
Ever since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have been 
assured that there was a solution to the problem of nuclear 
waste. In the case of high-level radioactive wastes, however, 
which are generated as byproducts of the defense nuclear 
weapons program and the commercial generation of electric-
ity, resolution of the problem has been continually post-
poned. There was disagreement in the scientific community 
over the disposal method, dissension in the nuclear industry 
among those who viewed the reactor spent fuel as a resource 
versus those who viewed it as a waste, and disarray in the 
federal government where politics, inept management, and 
neglect played havoc with waste management programs. In 
the words of one former Atomic Energy Commission official , 
"It was not glamorous; there were no careers; it was messy; 
nobody got brownie points for caring about nuclear waste. " 
In the late '70s, pressure began to mount for a coordinated, 
national effort to contend with growing inventories of defense 
and commercial wastes. Reprocessing of spent fuel was not 
economically feasible, the wastes were an obstacle to nuclear 
industry expansion, storage pools at reactor sites were filling, 
leaks had occurred at defense installations, and the public 
sensitivity was aroused by a growing anti-nuclear movement 
and reactor safety problems. 
Finally, in the last hours of the 1982 lame duck session, 
Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Four aspects of 
the Act are especially noteworthy: first , it ended the debate 
over method by mandating deep geologic disposal; second, it 
established schedules for the siting of two repositories ; third, 
it assigned the federal government and the Department of 
Energy (DOE) with responsibility for disposal; and fourth , it 
recognized that states and Indian tribes had to be involved. 
Storage vs. Disposal 
It is important to understand the distinction between stor-
age and disposal, because the words are frequently inter-
changed. A repository is not for temporary storage. Very 
simply, disposal , like a diamond, is forever. In this case, 
disposal is synonymous with permanent and irretrievable. 
After a short operating period of about 50 years, a repositmy 
will be forever sealed. It will not be possible to directly 
monitor the wastes, remedy problems, or remove the wastes if 
something unanticipated occurs during the 10,000 year isola-
tion period. (lf you have a difficult time visualizing 10,000 
years into the future , think ofthe past. Going back 10,000 years 
takes us to the time of the early cave paintings in Europe and 
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to man's first attempts at agriculture.) 
Because work was already underway at some potential 
disposal locations in the West prior to passage of the Act, those 
sites were grandfathered into the first repository program 
which is now focusing on basalt formations at Hanford, 
Washington, volcanic tuff at the Nevada Test Site, and bedded 
salts in the Texas Panhandle. The second repository program, 
which is eight years behind the first , includes Minnesota and 
other eastern states that have deposits of oystalline rock. In 
January of this year, DOE se lected 12 sites in seven states for 
further study for a second repository. Three of the 12 are in 
Minnesota, as well as five other back-up sites. 
In recent months it has become more apparent to us that 
there is no need for a secondary repositmy within the time 
frame of current planning efforts. Back in 1980, when Con-
gress began to consider legislation, DOE estimated that 
167,000 metric tons would need to be disposed of by the year 
2020. By 1985, that figure had dropped to 106,000 metric tons. 
If one assumes no new reactor orders, which has been the 
case for the last seven years, that figure drops to 75,000 tons. 
Last week the Governor of Minnesota testified before a U.S. 
Ho use Subcommittee at an oversight hearing on the second 
repository program. He noted that nearly 15,000 Minnesotans 
voiced their alarm and opposition to this unnecessa1y siting 
program at DOE briefings and hearings. He also observed that 
scientists should be concerned because this program lacks the 
technical credibility and commitment to excellence that 
should be its hallmark. 
Why Scientists Should Be Concerned 
I would now like to consider why scientists should be 
concerned about this program. 
First, the schedule drives the federal nuclear waste pro 
gram. Nobody had a Clystal ball back in 1982 when Congress 
wrote milestone dates into the Act, although clairvoyants are 
going to be necessary to ensure 10,000 years of isolation of 
wastes in the repository. The complexity of the task was never 
anticipated. We had a similar situation in 1985 in Minnesota 
when the legislature required that a herd of wild elk be 
relocated by September 1. Despite good intentions and 
advance planning, the legislature did not have the coopera-
tion of the elk, and most of the herd is still defiantly roaming 
northwestern Minnesota. 
In the case of the nuclear waste program, DOE is willing to 
compromise technical quality in an effort to meet the Act's 
unrealistic deadlines. Few observers believe that the goal of a 
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first repository operation date of 1998 is attainable in a pro-
gram that is already nearly a year and a half behind schedule, 
yet DOE still clings to an overly optimistic schedule at the 
expense of program credibility and the time needed for scien-
tific investigation. 
Second, in the rush to conform to deadlines, and in the light 
of political expediency and preconceived notions of how the 
job should be done, a commitment to technical excellence is 
missing. Last week, the State of Minnesota released a report 
that was highly critical of the conduct of the national survey of 
oystalline rock that was used to justify selection of the 17 
second repository states, all in the eastern half of the country. 
This survey is the very foundation of the second repository 
siting process. Yet a review of materials obtained following a 
Freedom-of- Information-Act request revealed that, in the 
words of the contractors, the survey was prepared "almost as a 
formality .. .it has never been the intent for this to be a really 
thorough study ... something less than 1.0 man-year was 
expended on this task" These observations were borne out by 
the harsh criticism directed at the survey by the scientific 
community when it was released in draft form in 1979. In fact, 
a final survey was never issued. Yet DOE directed that work 
begin in the areas identifled in that flawed draft. 
Three years later, after the Act was passed, DOE spent less 
than four months resuscitating the same survey. It was 
released again, without public review, to confer legitimacy on 
the 1983 selection of 17 crystalline states. Not only was the 
effort less than adequate , but the survey was technically 
flawed and illogically executed, creating a bias that resulted in 
picking crystalline rock bodies only in the East. 
Last year, the states had to go to court to win the right to 
funding for their own technical confirmation studies after 
DOE denied the State of Nevada money for drilling studies. 
DOE was willing to allow review of its data, but no collection 
of independent data. 
Third, even though the jury is still out on the suitability of 
crvstalline rock for waste isolation, as well as on a number of 
g~ophysical, geochemical, and hydrologic questions, the fed-
eral government is still proceeding with site selection. Canada 
is far ahead of the U.S. in crystalline rock research. However, 
the Canadians have stated that they won't be ready to make a 
decision on the suitability of crystalline rock until after the 
turn of the century, and only then will they begin to consider 
sites. Here in the U.S., we've bought into that very same 
research (the U.S. recently agreed to spend about 17 million 
dollars on cooperative research in Canada) yet we've already 
made the decision to pursue disposal in crystalline rock and 
are in the process of selecting sites. We've put the cart before 
the horse. 
Fourth, the siting program i:; tarnished with conflicts-of-
interest. DOE relies heavily on contractors. In some instances, 
the prime contractors charged with oversight and quality assu-
rance responsibility are also conducting the actual work In 
others, the experts that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
1 :\RC) hopes to use for its independent licensing review are 
the same experts that DOE is dependent on for siting work 
\ Ioney talks, and in the DOE siting program, it 's yelling at 
experts who also are being sought by the NRC and the states. 
The difficulty in finding untainted experts has led the NRC to 
propose a stable of "kept" reviewers that could be separated 
trom DOE activities until licensing begins in the mid-90's. 
Also, in the second repository program, contractor responsi-
bil ity has been assigned by geographic region. This affects 
objectivity because it is in the contractor's economic self-
lnterest to ensure that sites in their region remain under 
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consideration. We 're all too familiar with inadvisable projects 
that develop a momentum of their own when money, jobs, 
and reputations are at stake. 
Fifth, research money for waste reduction and other waste 
management alternatives is being eliminated. In addition, 
DOE wants to drop demonstration programs for extended 
fuel burn-up, a technique that would substantially reduce the 
amount of waste by burning reactor fuel more efficiently. 
Penny-wise and pound foolish, DOE would cut a few million 
dollars that would promote a very promising technology that 
could save billions by further diminishing the need for a 
second repository. 
Sixth, the federal government does not, and I repeat, does 
not , have as its goal selection of the safest possible sites. DOE 
readily admits that all they're looking for are sites that meet the 
minimum licensing criteria. How is DOE ever going to be able 
to convince a prospective host state to shoulder this national 
burden if they're unable to argue that it was chosen because it 
was the safest possible? 
Given all the disposal uncertainties and the 10,000 year 
length of the isolation period, we should expect nothing less 
of DOE than a commitment to find the sites with the greatest 
margin of safety. DOE likes to respond to this criticism by 
arguing that there will never be full agreement on where the 
safest possible sites are. They are probably right, but we are 
still certain that the program would greatly benefit from this 
objective. At a recent hearing before a very unreceptive Senate 
Subcommittee, Minnesota argued for just such an approach. 
In a follow-up written interrogatory, the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee asked whether a search for the safest possible 
site wasn't analogous to setting out across the country looking 
for the best restaurant - how would you ever know or agree 
that you had found it? We didn't think the analogy was very 
appropriate, but we carried it a step further by responding that, 
even if the outcome were uncertain, the endeavor would still 
be worthwhile if you knew that you had to eat three meals a 
clay at the chosen restaurant for the next 10,000 years. 
Finally, permanent disposal may not be the best solution. 
Ever since the Atomic Energy Commission first looked at the 
nuclear waste problem in 1955, the mindset has been dispo-
sal. The National Academy of Sciences Committee that was 
created that year issued their first report recommending geo-
logical disposal in 1957. This solution shouldn't have come as 
a surprise because it was a product of the "Committee on 
Geological Aspects of Waste Disposal.'' 
There was a short flirtation with storage in later years, but it 
was abandoned because the federal government and nuclear 
power proponents were vulnerable to the charge that there 
was no "final " solution. In the 1980 Environmental Impact 
Statement on nuclear waste management, storage was labeled 
the no-action alternative and dismissed in one paragraph. 
That's about the same amount of space that the National 
Lampoon iVlagazine gave to their proposal for waste disposal 
in tupperware containers because "they close up tight and 
keep something just about forever." When the Act was finally 
passed in 1982, Congress chose deep geological disposal. The 
Wall Streetjournalcallecl it the "Geologist's Full Employment 
Act" and noted that, "it was the largest public works program 
ever foisted onto the American public by Congress." 
Why the obsession with burial? The two reasons most often 
given are first, it reduces the likelihood of reprocessing and 
possible proliferation of weapons-grade plutonium and, 
second, it eliminates the need for institutions that must have 
the longevity to guarantee a secure and safe storage site. But 
disposal provides no assurance that reprocessing or prolifera-
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tion won't occur anyway, and it's difficult to understand the 
concern over institutional control when a similar concern 
exists for nuclear weapons and toxic chemicals. 
I think there also are less visible agendas. Some in industty 
feel that an "out of sight, out of mind" waste policy is the only 
way to revive nuclear power. Some opponents of nuclear 
power view disposal as a costly, slow process that could 
further delay that revival. 
Advantages of Long-Term Storage 
But long-term storage warrants another look because it has 
some very distinct advantages. Geology is less important, so 
there are fewer siting constraints. Direct monitoring of the 
waste would be possible, and any unforeseen problems could 
be remedied. Future technological development could result 
in safer disposal or a new use for the waste. Even if there were 
no such technological developments, the fuel would have 
cooled in the interim, both thermally and radioactively. Last, 
but certainly not least, long-term storage would be less costly 
than disposal, and it might even be politically easier to site. I 
can 't help but believe that future generations would prefer to 
have passed on to them the options associated with responsi· 
ble storage, rather than the uncertainties associated with per-
manent and irretrievable disposal. In fact, the only thing cer-
tain about deep geologic disposal is that the people making 
the decisions won 't be around to answer for them. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I want to note that this is a political, as well as 
technical process. Anyone who tells you otherwise is either 
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incredibly naive or a liar. Concentration on politics alone, 
however, is inadvisable. When told the results of an over· 
whelmingly negative Wisconsin referendum in 1984, in which 
89 percent of the voters opposed a repositoty, DOE 
responded that it was very encouraged by the 11 percent that 
favored a site. 
While you're all probably aware of the position the Gover-
nor, the Legislature, and our Congressional delegation have 
taken in opposing a disposal site in Minnesota, you're proba-
bly less aware of the technical side to our effort, which is just as 
important. Since 1983, the State has actively monitored the 
federal program. We have retained outside technical and state 
agency contractors, we testifY before the NRC, we review all 
documents released by the DOE and other federal agencies 
working on this program, and we have submitted hundreds of 
pages of analysis and comments. 
We aren 't dissuaded by the "not in my backyard" label -
it 's currently a very trendy way to dismiss public concern and 
legitimate questions. Our philosophy has been to take as 
critical an approach as possible, maintaining that the burden 
of proof rests with the federal government. We intend that the 
burden be a heavy one, and we will ask every question and 
explore every avenue along the way. 
Author's note: On May 28, 1986, the U.S Department of 
l:.'nergy ·postponed indefinitely" the second repository pro-
gram. The DOE cites some of the same arguments raised in this 
article with respect to declining waste generation projections 
to justify postponement. Nonetheless, most of the critical p oints 
raised here still apply to the DOE nuclear waste program. 
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